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This comparative study questions whether the transformation of state television into pub-
lic service television was successful in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Romania. It analyzes the context in which public service televisions operate, as well
as their professional identity and mission in the dual broadcasting markets. The study
also evaluates the editorial independence of public service television in the region, and
puts forward policy proposals to improve its performance.
1. Introduction: A decade of freedom and disillusionment
Eastern Europe’s rapid pace of change in the past ten years has meant that
developments that would normally occur over the course of many years took
place in just one decade. The fate of public television is illustrative in this
respect. In just one decade public television in former Communist countries
evolved from being a powerful state propaganda instrument (Serbian
Television under Milosevic) to an instrument of popular liberation (the ‘Live
Romanian Revolution’) and finally to a position of increasingly minor media
and political relevance. This evolution was not only more concentrated than
the Western European experience, but also substantially different. Freedom of
the press and deregulation of broadcasting in ECE1 emerged in an unstable
political and social environment, in societies searching for an identity and a
normative system to replace the Communist one. The legacies of the
Communist times, transition and its accompanying deregulation and fiscal aus-
terity policies, and the desperate power struggles between the old and the
emerging political elites also shaped the fate of public television, the once all-
powerful media actor. As a result, the constraints under which broadcasters
work have substantially increased. Ten years after the fall of communism,
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1. Abbreviations used are: ECE - East Central Europe; EBU - European Broadcasting Union; EU -
European Union; EC - European Commission; CE - Council of Europe; TVR- Romanian
Television; CT- Czech Television; BC - Broadcasting Council; MTV – Hungarian (Magyar)
Television; PTV- Polish Television; BTV- Bulgarian Television.
despite parliaments passing legislation to transform state television into pub-
lic service television, commercial channels have largely taken over and become
market leaders, while public service channels encounter growing deficits and
crises of legitimacy.
Few studies have focused on the role of the media and broadcasting in new
democracies and the relationship between the media and the emerging political
and social order (O’Neill 1998 Sparks 1995; 1998). Unlike the rest of the media,
public broadcasting is still subject to political influence in many Western coun-
tries (France and Italy are the best examples). Second-wave democracies such as
Spain, Greece and Portugal offer closer models to compare with the situation in
ECE. Yet, these second-wave democracies were authoritarian rather than total-
itarian regimes. Totalitarianism is intent on conquering the souls of the people
under its rule; its use of television to that respect could be the object of a specif-
ic study in itself. There are therefore almost no telling examples to resort to
when studying the transition of ECE media from totalitarianism to free market
society. 
To understand the situation of the media in ECE after the fall of commu-
nism, it is important to note that media freedom was not granted to the sector
by governments via negotiations but grew independently within most countries
once it became clear that there were no longer any communist barriers to pre-
vent free speech. Only at a later stage did media freedom become institutional-
ized to a certain extent. In some countries journalists opposed any attempt to
regulate the media for fear that the regulation might be used to curtail their
newly acquired freedom. Even when laws were eventually passed, pirate radio
stations continued to broadcast without a license in Poland and Romania, for
example. Some countries were slower than others to privatize the state media,
and privatization did little to stem the sudden emergence of new, private news-
papers and radio stations. The new governments inherited power over televi-
sion. In the print press sector, while some of the communist press survived, the
new climate of relative openness initially sparked the emergence of hundreds of
newspapers. This furious outburst of expression is perhaps, as Gáspár Miklós
Tamás has noted, the most important phenomenon of the transition process
(Tamás 1999). 
Nevertheless, the new regimes proved as intent on keeping control over state
media as the communist regimes had been, and in many cases state television
continued to serve merely as a government mouthpiece (O’Neill 1998). Yet,
since all ECE countries became Council of Europe members and later associate
members of the European Union, they are subject to the latest European policy
on broadcasting – the Television without Frontiers directive – which, over the
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course of a few years only, led to the deregulation and liberalization of the tele-
vision market. Therefore, private television was established before the govern-
ments resigned themselves to freeing public service channels. Private television
channels demonstrated the need for politicians to find more subtle ways of using
the media in the new context of the pluralism. Romanian Television (TVR), for
instance, presented the defeat of the post-communist government in the 1996
local elections as a victory, yet since three other private channels were already in
existence and ready to dispute its claim, its effort only served to further damage
its credibility. 
During the early phase of reform, discussions about the ‘public interest’ were
left behind by the fast pace of events. New commercial broadcasters broke their
original broadcast license commitments and succeeded in having laws revised to
meet their needs as well as to accommodate public demand for commercial chan-
nels.
We once again face one of transition’s essential problems: the New World
that people dreamt of and looked up to under Communism has little to do with
the reality people face today in those countries. The idealized Western
European model that people looked up to has either changed so radically that it
has practically vanished, or has become inaccessible for ECE countries.
Transition countries are bound to an ever-changing destination – knowing what
the destination looked like when they embarked, yet knowing also that by the
time they arrive it may have radically changed. In other words, a clear model for
the transformation of public service broadcasting is missing in Europe, despite
the democratic norms being put forward by, amongst others, the Council of
Europe. This, of course, has complicated these services’ transition in Eastern
Europe.  
2. Reaching a successful public television model
This paper surveys the transformation of public television in the Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The period of time I look at
goes from the onset of democratic regimes in 1989 or 1990 until today, meaning
before and after broadcasting legislation was adopted in all of these countries.
The analysis is based on the study of new broadcasting legislation and interviews
I had with executives of public service and private television channels as well as
politicians and media analysts in the fall of 1999 in Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Romania. Last but not least, my two years’ experience as director
in charge of reform at the Romanian Television and the consultancy advice
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received on this opportunity from Western colleagues contributed to the con-
clusions of this survey.
The deregulation of the television markets provoked a wide debate in
Europe over television’s role. It was rightly stressed that one’s conception of
broadcasting must be in step with one’s larger conception of society (Tracey:
1993: 19). The two main philosophies concerning public television, econom-
ic and democratic, are usually presented as being mutually exclusive
(Atkinson: 1997). However in this paper I will try to view them as comple-
mentary. In my view, in a society transiting both from totalitarianism to
democracy and from a command to a market economy the two approaches are
not exclusive, but in fact complementary. Therefore, I will examine the inde-
pendence of state television, i.e,  the freedom of both managers and journalists
to run  public television as well as the performance of state television in trans-
forming itself into an institution able to adjust to market competition and sur-
vive.
I consider the independence of public television to be the main objective of the
transformation; and this despite the absence of one clear model, and important
differences between the starting points for each country. By independence of
television I mean the freedom of both managers and journalists to run public
service television and its programs as they see fit and without government inter-
ference, as is the case with private media outlets. This is what I call transition
from ‘state to public’. There are essential differences between public, state and
private television. In the first case the public is the main stakeholder; in the sec-
ond, the government; and in the third, the private owners. The struggle for
legitimacy is therefore essential for public television alone. To justify public
funding, public service television cannot afford to be partisan – it must be objec-
tive and act in the public interest. While state television complies with the
interests of the state (namely the government), public service television serves
as society’s “trustee” which requires absolute independence from the govern-
ment.
Like other proponents of the democratic philosophy, I acknowledge there-
fore that public service television has a ‘mission.’ But I would not go so far as to
say that this mission involves educating citizens to provide them with a cultur-
al and national identity. While other public institutions should pursue this
ambitious purpose, television is not an appropriate medium for the promotion
of high culture. Rather, the mission of public service television lies in provid-
ing the necessary information for a citizen to facilitate his or her enlightened
participation in the democratic process, i.e. providing objective, in-depth and
prompt information.  Considering Western European practice, this mission
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seems quite difficult to attain, although the enlightening model of the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) goes to show that the goal is not unattain-
able. Further additions to this basic mission seem only to hinder the freedom
of the broadcaster to search and define its own identity. Such freedom is vital
for the survival of any institution, the media is no exception. As stated in 1993
by the former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Catherine
Lalumière, “the independence of public broadcasting is vital for a democracy
[...]. Some say independence from political power is only a dream. I would say
it is a necessity.”
However, I am close to the market philosophy approach to public service
television on several important points complementing the model of public ser-
vice television I propose. It is important to understand that state broadcasting
under communism was very different from state broadcasting in democratic
societies, even accounting for governmental interference in the latter. State
broadcasting journalists enjoyed the communist parties’ trust. Journalism
schools were either infiltrated by communist ideology, or merely served as
departments within propaganda schools for party apparatchiks. Employees had
tenure regardless of performance. State television under communism was com-
parable to any other part of the public administration providing a public service
and performing an administrative function. It is then not surprising that these
organizations are still over-staffed with employees who manifest the kind of
self-preserving behavior characteristic of bureaucracies in oversized states.
Turning from direct state funding to license fees as main income revenue was
not welcomed by these institutions, since license fees are a less reliable source
of revenue. As late as 1999, a Hungarian Television (MTV) executive argued that
the only solution to resolve the station’s financial crisis would be the return to
complete state funding. 
The reform of public television organizations should therefore be viewed
within the context of general administrative reform in ECE countries. Its objec-
tive should be to become a consumer-oriented service provider and improve its
performance in terms of audience ratings, financial revenues and cost-benefit
evaluation. ECE institutions have little choice but to step into contemporary
Western approaches rather than chart a new course, given the high risks of
experimentation in a poor economic environment.
Furthermore, as candidates for European Union accession, the ‘capitalist
way’ is the only institutional logic for ECE countries to follow. This, in turn,
requires that institutions develop competitive management, satisfy consumers
and become less dependent on state resources. Early public administration
models addressing market competition (i.e. Doel 1979) seemed to imply that
35
the emergence of private channels should spark competitive practices among
public service channels. In reality, this is not necessarily the case. Both the old-
fashioned socialists (i.e. the communist parties’ successors) and liberals defend-
ing fair competition claim that public service television should not be endan-
gered by competition and should be allowed to pursue its old program policies
regardless of audience ratings. They do not explain, however, how public ser-
vice television can survive as its audience narrows, its legitimacy as a license fee
collector is put into question, and its role is reduced to one comparable to the
Public Broadcasting System in the United States. Good television must be com-
petitive television. The main performance indicator is a quantitative indicator
– market share.
A second, more qualitative, indicator is ‘identity’. The more a channel is iden-
tified with specific, good quality programs that cannot be found elsewhere, the
more it is considered to provide ‘good television’. In this case, the opinion of
professional elites, journalists and critics, matters more than the public’s opin-
ion in the evaluation of identity and performance, although the elite’s and the
public’s opinion often overlap. Both public ratings and many European journal-
ists have indicated that Euronews improved more under the management of ITN
than when it was managed as a pure public venture. The issue of independence
has a strong effect on performance. There must be a clear separation between
areas controlled by the broadcaster (internal organization, human resources and
program policy) and areas controlled by the state.
3. The Western European experience
Many of the problems encountered by public service television in the region
are identical to problems that were experienced by Western countries in the
recent past. Deregulation is seen to be the root of those problems, imposed
either by technological developments or by European directives liberalizing the
market. Yet deregulation may have only revealed the extent to which public tele-
vision fits uneasily in the new global era where state monopolies have vanished
and competition knows no borders. 
Achille Yves has described these problems as an ‘identity crisis’, a ‘financial
crisis’ and an ‘organizational crisis’:  
“Identity crisis: what purpose does a public broadcaster serve today and
how can [a public broadcaster] be justified in a competitional environ-
ment? Financial crisis: on what basis is the financing of a television
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channel secured? Budget grants become quite hard to retain in states
that display tight budget policies and, in general, take an increasingly
liberal stand. [...] All [a public broadcaster] can do is increase advertis-
ing and sponsoring revenues, but this implies less ambitious program-
ming,  closer to that of commercial television. Organizational crisis:
public sector organizations grew in relative abundance when the issue
of cost was not as imperative as it is currently. Therefore, public service
structures are not able to meet present financial and programming chal-
lenges. Heavy organizational structures and overly powerful unions
close to corporatism hinder the motivation and creativity of the staff”
(Achille 1994).
The crisis of European public service television is primarily a conceptual one.
Initially conceived as state monopolies in an era when television was seen as a
public good and bound to provide a range of goods to the public (supplying edu-
cation, information and entertainment). Such channels were what the French
call generalistes, that is, channels providing mixed programming. Their initial
mission was to cover everything from entertainment to news. Such a variety of
programming, from opera to a popular drama, from children’s show to news, can
work only if a channel is alone in the market – it is common knowledge that this
type of scheduling would be a disaster in a competitive environment. Moreover,
the majority of these programs were produced in-house due to the institutions’
monopoly of the market. This means that public television’s monopoly was bro-
ken while it was still burdened with departments of drama, children’s program-
ming, fiction,  music, game shows etc. In continental Europe, labor legislation
dictated that most public television workers secure permanent rather than tem-
porary contracts, so the organization was bound to continue producing a large
variety of programs in order to support its employees throughout their lifetimes.
In some of these countries, powerful trade unions have also had a say in the man-
agement of public service television. 
Domestic legislation and the adaptability of management created different
situations in different countries and various adjustment responses to the same
crisis. The crisis was certainly precipitated both by the deregulation and re-reg-
ulation of the broadcast industry, prompted by technological and economic
change, and by the political will to create new opportunities amid such change
(Hoffman-Riem 1992). States gave up their monopolies as owners of the only
broadcaster. (In some cases, as in Great Britain, this was accomplished long ago
and a private monopoly was created to balance the public one.) However, they
did not give up their roles as overseers of the broadcasting world. As the concept
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of private television was increasingly accepted, the state preserved the power to
grant licenses in exchange for private broadcaster commitments (what the
French call cahiers de charge). 
While some states have strict requirements and force private broadcasters to
commit to some level of public interest broadcasting, others do not. Even in
states with strict public interest requirements, it became obvious in time that
making private companies reach high thresholds of quality was a practical impos-
sibility, as they could always claim that practical difficulties endangered their sur-
vival. Therefore, even in over-regulated France, regulations were altered after
private broadcasters failed to abide by them. European broadcasting legislation
over the past two decades is still struggling to catch up with reality in this area.
Hoffman-Riem was right to stress that “in the event of a gap between norm and
reality they [the supervisory authorities] often felt compelled to adjust the norm
to match reality” (1992).
The centerpiece of European legislation concerning broadcasting is the
89/552/ECC, or the Television without Frontiers directive, as amended in 1997.
However, the broadcasting policy of the European Union was partly shaped by
a European Supreme Court of Justice decision, which defined broadcasting as a
‘service’, as well as the 1986 treaty requiring member states to suppress all bar-
riers preventing the free circulation of services, goods, persons and capital from
December 31, 1992. The Television without Frontiers directive only pursued this
logic further, requiring broadcasters to apply for licenses in only one member
state to enable them to broadcast in other member states. The directive, howev-
er, required that the majority of broadcasts should be European produced. The
MEDIA program was subsequently created to increase the competitiveness of
the European audio-visual industry.
Once broadcasting became a matter of common European policy, it could no
longer be regulated by member states attempting to protect their national pub-
lic service broadcaster. This led to a market explosion and public broadcasters
were soon faced with an extremely difficult situation. The governments and
Parliaments of national states did little to help. They occasionally covered the
broadcasters’ deficits (as in Italy and France), but were reluctant to grant them
the autonomy needed in order to survive competition and prevent further
deficits. A media committee at the Italian Parliament once took 16 months to
approve the quantum of advertising allowed on public channels. Except in the
Netherlands, some degree of political dependence by the public broadcaster is
seen as acceptable in continental Europe. In Italy, for example, influence over
the three channels of the Italian RAI used to be ‘shared’ among the three
strongest political parties.  Spanish TVE is controlled by whoever is in govern-
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ment (Escobar 1997). The tenure of public television management in Italy, Spain
and Greece is a little over one year. Even in France and Germany, public broad-
casting supervisory boards are politicized along left/right cleavages and accord-
ing to informal political arrangements, with ‘sharing’ of the main board positions
usual. German law provides for the highest degree of managerial autonomy in
continental Europe, with important powers granted to the general manager. The
complicated power-sharing arrangements in federal Germany between the cen-
tral government and the regions also ease political intervention in the affairs of
public broadcasters to some extent.
The interplay of political influences is part of the institutional culture sur-
rounding public service television in Europe. While it is not always codified in
legal texts, as in Spain, the removal of top-level management when the govern-
ment is changed is the norm rather than the exception. This institutional culture
explains why politically motivated management changes do not even get report-
ed as incidents (except when connected to a media scandal). Therefore, countries
such as Italy, Greece and Spain are listed in Freedom House ratings as having
‘free’ public television even though this freedom is all but relative for public ser-
vice broadcasters. Clearly, freedom has a different meaning for European jour-
nalists working in public service broadcasting compared to those working in the
private media or the American public service media. From this perspective, the
situation of the BBC in Europe is the exception rather than the rule. Although
many European public service television channels, including German public
television, were initially modeled on the BBC, it is quite clear that this model
cannot be reproduced in Europe. Of course, the situation of public service media
in Europe is largely dependent on a country’s specific elite political culture. In
countries like Great Britain and the Netherlands, the governments show more
respect for the public service media’s position as an independent actor. In coun-
tries where pluralism means dividing the pie between different political elite
groups, lotizzazione2 is the rule of the game. This is the case in Italy and to some
extent in Greece and Spain (see Figure 1). In such contries, in all likelihood, pub-
lic television will be under political influence. In countries, where corporatism
or informal power-sharing arrangements reign in politics, politics will most like-
ly also influence public television.
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2. The term has been coined at RAI to suggest the division of channels and positions in public ser-
vice television between the political parties. The term matches the ‘partitocrazia’ concept introduced
by Giovanni Sartori in the theory of democracy to designate this particular type of pluralism (Sartori,
1994).
Table 1. Public service television channel freedom, identity and performance in selected
European Union countries, 1999
P TV Editorial Managerial Identity Performance  
freedom freedom by market  
share (%)
France Some ideological bias ** Generalist; local 45
(FR2, on the left-right
FR3) cleavage 
(FH rating: 12-free) ** Generalist 48.9
Italy Plurality of views Entertainment
rather than objectivity 
(FH rating: 15-free)
Great Britain Balanced, fair * News; generalist 40
(FH rating: 8- free)
Spain Some influence by *** Generalist; 51.9
the government entertainment
(FH rating: 13-free)
Greece Government influence *** Generalist 8.2
(FH rating 15-free)
Germany Some ideological bias ** Generalist 41
on the left-right cleavage
(FH rating: 6-free)
Legend: Freedom House (FH) scores from 0 maximum freedom to 45 minimum. Managerial free-
dom scores from * maximum freedom to **** severely restricted freedom, ratings by the author.
Germany, Great Britain and, to some extent, France managed to maintain
their respective public service television identities despite important program
adjustments. The Italian RAI and Spanish TVE adopted more commercial
strategies and set out to battle private competitors on their own grounds. The
Greek ERT could not decide which strategy to adopt and remained lingering
between the two. The changes did little to address major problems and even
increased public service television’s dependency on the state and/or government,
leaving it vulnerable when caught in the crossfire between demand for improved
performance and demand that public television promote ‘culture’ and remain
immune from competition. It is important to note that the autonomy of public
service media is an unfinished business in Western Europe. The following res-
olution of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) does not reflect current
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reality, but rather the necessary conditions for public service broadcasters to be
‘trustees of the nation’ (to use the famous expression of the 1925 British
Crawford Committee): 
“To perform this role, public broadcasters must: 
– be politically and financially independent;
– create legal mechanisms allowing for dynamic management in a context
of growing and aggressive competition;
– adapt their strategies to the rapid evolution of their environment,
streamline their operations, reduce operating costs, and increase creative
productivity;
– draw on reliable, diversified, adequate and evolutionary funding, both pub-
lic and commercial, irrespective of the form [of the public broadcaster.]”
Given the current state of affairs in Western European public broadcasting,
European supranational organizations seem to lack both the political will for
reform and a coherent model of public service media to export to ECE. There is
no successful European model of public service media reform available as there
is a model of judicial or administrative reform, for example. This left the ECE
public service media in a conceptual vacuum, without necessary allies for reform
when they were most needed. The approach of both the European Commission
and the Council of Europe was to push states to allow private television as an
alternative to public television without attempting to assist in the difficult task
of freeing the public service media.
Journalists and executives who set out to reform public service broadcasting
in ECE therefore resorted to their own models. In most cases such models were
extremely liberal ones, as these journalists and executives had either been trained
abroad or had worked for international public companies such as the BBC. This,
of course, provoked counter-reactions by groups endangered by the reforms,
who labeled the reformers as ‘aliens’ and even traitors to the national culture.
For example, in 1997 I had to defend a requirement that I had introduced for the
vacant position of news editor-in-chief of Romanian public television in the
Romanian Parliament – namely that he or she should have training or education
from a prestigious international media company – a condition all the more nec-
essary given that Romania did not have any form of education for television jour-




Despite the post-1989 explosion of new media described above, monopolies
and the absence of adequate systems of frequency distribution meant that state
television remained a powerful media player in ECE countries after the fall of
communism. In countries such as Romania, state television could make a presi-
dent in 1989-90, and those who rushed to TVR rather than other strategic loca-
tions after Ceausescu’s downfall became members of the first democratic gov-
ernment. A coup inside Bulgarian Television (BTV) in 1991 led to the decision
to provide balanced coverage of the political crisis, which in turn led to the res-
ignation of the prime minister. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first years
of transition were marked by struggles over the control of state television, while
issues of reform were secondary or nonexistent. Both the formal institutional and
the day-to-day approach to public service media were shaped by the political and
cultural environments in each post-communist country rather than by abstract,
imported ideas of public service broadcasting or freedom of the media. O’Neill
grasped the point when he wrote that “the media in Eastern Europe are a clear
example of how past institutional configurations influenced the process of media
transition, shaping the contours of the present struggle in this area” (1998).
In the Visegrád countries, where anti-communists came to power in the first
free elections, ‘democratization’ of television became an important public issue.
Some attempts were made for a lustration of the public service media, but they
did not go far (Sparks 1994; Molnár 1999). Whether they were anti-communist
or post-communist, politicians showed little or no interest in securing the inde-
pendence of state television. By 1999, all ECE countries surveyed had passed
their own broadcasting legislation, with some of this legislation already revised
or under revision (see Figure 2).
Table 2. Broadcasting and public service media laws in ECE
Country Date when passed Title
Czech Republic 1991 (amended Federal Law on the 
1992, modified in 2001) Operation of Radio and 
Television Broadcasts
Poland 1992 Broadcasting Act Law for
Hungary 1995 (took effect in 1996) Radio and Television
Romania 1992 Audio-visual Act
1994, amended 1998 Law for the Organization of
Public Radio and Television
Bulgaria 1998 Broadcasting Act
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Although the BBC represented the public television model aspired to by most
television executives whom I interviewed, the legal framework enacted in post-
communist countries could not be further removed from that of the BBC. New
legislation in ECE failed to replace ‘state’ or ‘government’ control of public ser-
vice television with ‘public’ control, since ‘public’ was interpreted almost exclu-
sively in terms of political representation. New broadcasting laws established a
firm partitocrazia in ECE with the party holding a parliamentary majority in con-
trol of public service television, even if the mandates of the television boards and
those of the parliament occasionally overlapped. 
Despite the firmly established grip of majority political parties over public
service television, practice shows a continuous political struggle to subordinate
and control public service channels. Public service media bills were therefore
merely catching up with reality, and delays in settling them were clearly based
on political motivations. Sparks is right to note that “the laws were implement-
ed not against the blank background of a new epoch but in a set of circumstances
where new habits and new patterns were already established” (1998). The only
important reform implemented as a result of the new broadcasting legislation
was the establishment of private stations. Those with illusions that the adoption
of public service television laws would end the fight for the control of television
were disappointed (Molnár 1999). Even the scheduling of non-political shows
fast became the object of political disputes. 
4.1. Appointing management
The most important issue regarding the independence of public service tele-
vision concerns the appointment (and dismissal) of managers and the limits of
their authority. Management scandals have plagued all of the countries surveyed,
with the sacking of either the general manager or the entire supervisory man-
agement boards a common practice. Before the new broadcasting laws were
passed, the appointment of public television management was the job of gov-
ernments (as in Hungary or Bulgaria), or presidents (as in Poland). According to
the new laws, such appointments are the responsibility of parliaments or parlia-
mentary committees. In practice this change matters little, since parliamentary
majorities reflect the same political interests. Governments and politicians are
united in protecting their class from media criticism. 
As analysts pointed out (Kleinwachter 1998; Goban-Glasz in O’Neill 1998),
political groups both on the right and the left of the political spectrum share a
common conception of the media as an instrument of political power, and pub-
lic service television in particular as the instrument of political power. Politicians
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tend to lack concern either for the public paying the public television license fees
or for the public television companies themselves. Most analysts consider this
enduring situation to be a consequence of communism. However, it is more like-
ly the result of a rational strategy by political actors in times of anomie, when they
are aware that no real accountability mechanisms exist. Similar situations in
Spain and Greece demonstrate that the use of public service media as a political
instrument outlasts ‘transition’. The Italian model of lotizzazione (dividing the
influence among political parties) is the most influential, with ECE politicians
often assuming that although the media will occasionally provide opposing view-
points, decisions about which viewpoints to air should not be left to the journal-
ists’ discretion alone. 
Arguments denying journalistic independence are bolstered by the fact that
relatively untrained journalists in these countries often abuse their right to
express their opinions and engage in false reporting, slander, etc. Nevertheless,
good journalism is impossible without some level of journalistic discretion about
what and how to report news. Journalism is a skill, and journalists are not only
hosts or intermediaries of opinions, but professionals who must acquire the skills
needed to successfully exercise their profession. 
Truth is not reached via a balance of political party influence on public ser-
vice media. It is often the case that no political party has a clue as to what the
truth is and journalists must express the views of civil society to reach a conclu-
sion based on facts. During my work as an executive in public service television,
politicians provided scores of opinions including the recommendation that hosts
must include anti-Semite representatives in talks on anti-Semitism, or that news-
casts should present all party briefings and leave the public to decide what is
important. Obviously, the ability to provide professional programming requires
that journalists be trusted to distinguish between a lackluster official briefing and
an event with some news value.
Such common disagreements about the role of journalism in a democratic
society, and specifically the appointment of media boards, played out different-
ly from country to country. In Hungary, the first appointed board served for
only a part of its term and was changed when the composition of parliament
changed. The public Hungarian MTV had an incomplete board from early 1999
where only government representatives were present, a situation that lasted until
Viktor Orban lost power in 2002. In Bulgaria, the last country to adopt a media
law, the socialist opposition refused to participate in the vote for the board,
saying that the law would only legitimize the government’s control over pub-
lic service television. The Romanian Parliament was unable to appoint a board
from 1994 until 1998.  In the Czech Republic, the entire newly appointed
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broadcasting board was sacked in 1994. In Poland, Lech Walesa fired the pres-
ident of the board in 1994. In 1996, the president of Polish Television (PTV) and
his entire management board were dismissed. 
On paper, the Polish and Bulgarian systems look better, as they seem to
increase the distance between the politically appointed boards (broadcasting
boards) and the management of public service television. In practice, however,
the situation could not be more different. Despite the fact that no legal provision
stipulates such practice, in Poland the broadcasting board appointed an equally
politicized television board that then divided the five positions of the manage-
ment board among the parties. In the fall of 1999 when I visited the Polish pub-
lic PTV, only one member of the management board had previous media man-
agement experience. The remaining members of the board were neither man-
agers nor journalists. Nevertheless, they were responsible for taking decisions on
micro-management issues including the media schedule. As one executive from
the Hungarian MTV pointed out in the spring of 1999, competition between
political party cronies is present within program scheduling and the commis-
sioning of outside producers. 
The Romanian Parliament goes so far as to directly appoint the president of
public service television. In October 1998, the board favored one candidate, the
parliamentary committee favored another, and a third candidate was favored by
the majority of parliament members, who managed to impose their choice. The
majority of board members then complained that they were forced to work and
take responsibility for their work with a candidate whose program ran counter
amongst to their vision of public service television. Eventually, the1998 law revi-
sion legalized conflict of interest situations, after which board members were
able, amongst other issues, to decide over the budget of their own department.
In the Czech Republic, frequent interventionism led to considerable public
mobilization against the political appointments of TV executives, and the
Parliament was compelled to change the law and allow representatives of civil
society to sit in the Board alongside political ones. 
The Hungarian system tried to emulate the German model; that is, it tried to
dilute political representation by granting civil society more influence from the
onset. However, there is confusion regarding the role of the management board
versus that of the supervisory board, both of which are overseen by the same
board of trustees. Hungarian law proclaims in section 55, article 1 that “the
boards of trustees are the management bodies of the public foundations’.” As the
situations in both Hungary and Bulgaria show, a supervisory board cannot and
should not act as a management board. Supervisory boards perform managerial
tasks with difficulty (trustees are not managers), and risk having vacant positions
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due to political disagreements. In Hungary, the media law grants as many board
seats for the parliamentary opposition as it does to government parties.
However, the opposition in the period 1998–2002 included both left wing and
right wing parties that failed to agree upon the makeup of the board. This led to
a deadlock situation. In Bulgaria, the former communists not only refused to par-
ticipate in the vote, but also complained about political hiring and firing at BTV,
with popular anchors replaced for political reasons, and denounced the ‘cynical
philosophy’ of the media law. Such deadlocks can be catastrophic for public tele-
vision companies such as the Hungarian MTV that are teetering on the edge of
bankruptcy and left without anybody in charge. 
Table 3. Appointing management in East Central European public service media
Polish PTV Hungarian MTV Czech CT Romanian TVR Bulgarian BTV
Who appoints the Broadcasting Parliament and Parliament Parliament (9 seats), Broadcasting
public service Board civil society government (1 seat) Board
television Board President (1),
employees (2)
Who appoints Broadcasting Parliament Television Parliament Broadcasting 
Chair Board Board Board
Who Appoints Same person Television Television Parliament Broadcasting
General Manager chairs the Board Board Board Board
and is GM
Who can dismiss Broadcasting Television Board Parliament/ Parliament Broadcasting 
Board/GM Board Parliament Television Board Board
Influence Political Political Parliament Political majority and Parliament
in the Board majority majority in general Parliament in general and President
Although it is obvious that provisional management is ineffective, parliaments
are not interested in the managerial reform of public media institutions. The
emphasis during transition was on programs and personalities rather than struc-
tures and mechanisms, demonstrating the lack of a broad understanding of the
aims of institutional reform. The lack of understanding about institutional
mechanisms is such that the mass media committee of the Romanian Parliament,
when conferring a mandate to the new public television general director in
January 1997, demanded a written strategy that would radically change pro-
gramming without touching institutional structures (for more on the appoint-
ment mechanisms see Figure 3).
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Table 4. Television Supervisory Board attributions and powers
Operation PTV MTV CT TVR BTV
License fee no no no no no
Budget yes yes yes yes yes
Schedule yes no no yes no
Management appointment yes yes yes yes yes
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that, apart from the Romanian Board of Trustees,
ECE public television boards are supervisory boards accountable to parliamentary
committees in charge of public broadcasting. This chain of supervisory organs
demonstrates politicians’ obsession with the control of public broadcasting when
the laws were passed. Every Parliament has seemed inclined to exercise the maxi-
mum supervisory rights possible over public service media during the first decade
of transformation. In the Czech Republic, CT’s News Director Jan Kytka was
forced to resign because one of his employees, a talk-show host, spoke with a par-
liamentary committee crony and denounced some of the government reforms.
After Kytka’s resignation, the same crony was appointed in his place. In Poland,
the parliamentary committee, more so than the broadcasting council, is pushing
the public television general manager to proceed with the reform of PTV. In
Hungary, the parliament appoints a remunerated, three-member team acting as a
permanent audit commission entrusted to supervise the supervisory board. 
4.2. Legal definition
Consensus about the legal definition of public service television is vital for its
independence and its survival. ECE public service television is based on the con-
tinental European model and carries advertising. In the case of Hungary and
Poland, public service television is now legally a ‘corporation.’ In Hungary, the
corporation’s unique shareholder is the Hungarian Television Public
Foundation, while in Poland it is the state represented by the Minister of
Finance. According to Hungarian law, assets from the state public television
budget were transferred to a new foundation rather than a corporation.
Bulgarian law laconically states that BTV is a ‘legal entity’, while Romanian law
defines it merely as a ‘public service’. 
In practice these definitions help little, since these companies have to act both
as public and commercial companies, pay taxes and cut jobs amid a complicated
mix of legislation applying to public and commercial entities and activities. The
legal confusion only increases costs. The Romanian TVR often faced this prob-
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lem.  Although TVR is neither a commercial corporation, nor a regie autonome
according to the French model and is not entitled to compensation from the
state budget like other state organizations, each time the government announced
an indexation of wages in the state sector and huge severance payoffs, unions
would demand unreasonable pay increases. Faced with the huge costs of a state
company along with the substantial tax burden of a private company, Romanian
public television faced the worst of both sectors during transition. 
The legal status of public service television is often subject to ideological
debates with practical consequences. While ‘public’ is a relatively new concept,
‘national’ is often understood to mean the subordination of the truth to the
national interest represented by the government or some official office-holder.
The 1994 Romanian media law begins with the statement that radio and televi-
sion companies would from then onwards be “editorially independent,
autonomous public services of national interest.” However, since the companies
were property of the state and the government decided the value of the license
fee, members of parliament viewed public media outlets as ‘national’ rather than
‘public’. The outlook was bleak for those seeking to transform public media into
truly ‘public’ companies. The 1998 Bulgarian law refers to public service broad-
casting as ‘national’ throughout the text. Even in the otherwise liberal Polish law,
the wording is dangerously ambiguous: Article 22/2 calls for the broadcaster to
“in a direct manner enable state organs to present and explain the policy of the
State.” Oppositely, according to the Hungarian law, public media employees
even cease to be ‘public servants’, a measure attempting to mark the total sepa-
ration between government and public service television.
4.3. Funding
The sometimes ambiguous difference between ‘national’ (or ‘state’) and ‘pub-
lic’ becomes clearer when it comes to funding. Public service television compa-
nies in ECE were once funded both by license fees and by state subsidies. After
the passage of the new media laws, state subsidies practically disappeared,
although they continue to exist as a legal possibility in Hungary and Poland. In
Bulgaria, license fees were only established as a possible revenue source at the
end of the 1990s. Government funds for public media are more of a burden than
a relief. Governments may pay late and/or present special conditions for receiv-
ing the money. 
The history of the 1998 amendments to the Romanian media law is telling.
Despite the fact that the Romanian Parliament took one and a half years to cor-
rect the 1994 law, the corrections were minor. All suggestions by experts from
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the BBC and Freedom House were overruled. TVR’s lobby was successful only
on a few minor points, although these points were vital for the short-term finan-
cial recovery of the channel. Members of parliament approved the articles that
helped TVR with its urgent financial needs but refused to grant it any autono-
my that would have helped to prevent the channel from slipping into similar
financial crises in the future. Later, in 2002, the Parliament dealt TVR a deadly
blow by accepting the private television lobby’s proposal that advertisements on
public television could be broadcast only between two programs without even
suggesting how resulting financial losses could be compensated. 
The step from direct subsidies to license fees as a major revenue source is
essential in freeing public service television from the clutches of the state, but it
should be seen as a first step only. The license fee is a flat tax that is insufficient to
fund public service media even in Western Europe, where practically all citizens
are owners of audio-visual equipment and wealthy enough to pay around USD 10
monthly for the service (the exact value varies from country to country). In ECE,
license fees are small (in Romania they rose to USD 1 per month after being
increased three times in one year). Nevertheless, evasion is high and roughly half
the budget is dependent on external sources. The value of the license fee in
Bulgaria, for example, is equivalent to the price of a newspaper. Public service
television channels complain that license fees are not adjusted by governments to
account for high regional inflation rates. In March 1999, the value of Romania’s
currency (in relation to the USD) dropped from ROL 10,000 to 15,000 in one
week, thus sharply cutting the value of license fees by a third. In such unstable
economic environments, companies cannot survive on state subsidies or
taxes/fees. At times when the value of one month’s salary may be cut by a third
over the course of a week, raising the tax would only encourage more evasion.
Commercial earnings remain the safest source of revenue for public service
media in ECE. However, these depend on the company’s performance, judged
primarily by audience ratings, which in their turn are a function of the freedom
that public media managers have to compete with private television channels.
Meanwhile, media legislation, government intervention and private media com-
pany lobbies are strong enough to hinder the efforts of public service television
to compete. For example, despite its financial problems, the Bulgarian BTV was
forbidden by the new media law to run advertising during prime time hours until
the launch of a nation-wide private competitor. The law was sharply criticized
in this regard by Dr. Werner Rumphorst, Director of the Legal Affairs
Department of the European Broadcasting Union.3
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3. Quoted by Capital/Agency for Investment Information Ltd., December 15, 1998.
4.4. Mission
So far we have seen how ECE public television companies are defined and
funded. The next important issue to explore in order to better understand the
reform of public media in the region is how the companies’ mission is devised
and implemented. 
All broadcasting laws in the region specify that the production of national pro-
grams is an obligation for public service television, although the emphasis on this
task and the program production quotas required may vary from country to coun-
try. Article 15 of the Polish law is the least restrictive, setting a quota whereby
only 30 percent of programs must be nationally produced, compared to 40 per-
cent in Romania and 50 percent in Hungary. In Hungary, the law also demands
that 15 percent of total air time be devoted to national films and 70 percent to
European productions. The Czech and Slovak federal law, ratified after the dis-
solution of the federation by both parliaments, sets no quota but specifies that
broadcasters are obliged to produce a “significant share of the broadcast programs
in such a way that the cultural identities of nations, nationalities and ethnic groups
[...] be preserved and that the development of domestic and European audio-visu-
al creation be supported.” All states either ratified the European directives or are
in the process of doing so. This means that quotas require a certain amount of
European productions both for the public and private sectors.
All of the broadcasting laws have some general provisions regarding cultural
and national identity, as well as programs destined for national minorities or chil-
dren. These are, however, general provisions that should not hinder schedulers
in their effort to provide a coherent style. More contestable are the provisions in
the Polish law regarding an obligation to enforce Christian values (Article 21/6
calls for “respect for the Christian system of values, accepting the grounds of the
universal principle of ethics”), and in the Romanian law a ban on “country and
nation defamation” (Article 5). Although the existence of minor ambiguities in
the laws offers opportunities for abuse and leads to complaints by journalists,
problems usually stem from public television channels’ practice rather than from
the laws themselves. The Bulgarian broadcasting law does however present prob-
lems in and of itself. BTV is compelled to provide live broadcasts of the parlia-
mentary plenary sessions and grant public addresses to the President, the
Chairman of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Chief Prosecutor,
the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court.
Hungarian, Romanian and Polish public service television channels have a
special obligation to provide programs for their Diaspora populations, which is
a heavy burden on their budgets. The Polish and Romanian public service
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broadcasters have separate channels dedicated to this task and funded by the
budget. In Hungary, a second public service broadcaster, Duna Televízió
(Danube Television) provides broadcasts for Hungarian minorities living in
neighboring countries. The channel has financial problems, as advertising com-
panies are not interested in reaching the Diaspora. Nationalism is a costly busi-
ness.
4.5. Conclusion
The passage of new broadcasting acts in ECE has contributed less to the
development of democracy than was initially expected. Their main merit is that
they led to the establishment of private television. This decision will have more
of a lasting impact on the democratization of these societies than the adoption
of public broadcasting laws. By interpreting democracy or public interest as the
division of the public sphere between existing political parties, these societies
merely depict the partitocrazia described by Italian political scientists – the kind
of incomplete pluralism encountered in countries with weak civil societies. New
management structures for public service television designed by parliaments in
ECE demonstrate an outdated conception of a public sector with unlimited
resources. Rather than placing importance on the empowerment of management
to make shrewd, rapid decisions to survive in a competitive environment, empha-
sis is instead placed on government control. 
This is a familiar picture for researchers studying public administration
reform in ECE countries. The predominant vision of public administration –
inherited first from the French-inspired constitutions after World War I and
then from the communist regimes – is that the sector is designed to control the
population rather than provide effective services. The obsession therefore
becomes not what public service television should do, but what it should not do.
The public is entirely disregarded in favor of the only true stakeholders – polit-
ical parties – as clearly demonstrated by the December 2000 Czech television
crisis. Public service television channels must satisfy various administrative
departments, often with antagonistic interests, even if this runs counter to the
company and the public’s interest. The more the decision regarding the amount
of advertising, scheduling and marketing strategy is taken by politicians rather
than managers the higher the risk becomes that performance will be crippled,
since political rationale and management rationale have little, if anything, in
common. The shortcomings of this vision are reflected mainly in the Bulgarian,
Romanian, and Hungarian laws. However, the actual situation seems to be sim-
ilar in all ECE countries, regardless of differences in the legal texts. 
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Public service television in ECE is only partly run by the managers. An
‘occult manager’4 is present in the decision-making process at all times – a mix-
ture of parliament intervention, government action – or lack of it (as regards,
for example, the subject of transmitters or license fees) – and trade union
behavior. Trade unions continue to garner their strength from communist-era
labor legislation that favors permanent contracts and makes any severance very
difficult. Because there are typically many different trade unions (numbers
between 10–15 are common) and all will fight management to protect narrow
interests, negotiations are rendered extremely difficult and leave little room
for managers. 
5. Performance 
The public, intellectual elites, the press, and politicians in ECE show con-
stant concern over the reform of public service broadcasting. Most of these con-
cerns seem contradictory and at times superficial. For instance, although occa-
sional management audits point to under-financing and poor organization rather
than exaggerated expenditures as the key problems, public service television is
often criticized for squandering public funds.5 Misunderstanding about the role
of public service television leads to further contradictions, with some accusing
public television of losing audiences, while others admonish it for losing its iden-
tity by competing for audiences with commercial channels.
My performance assessment is based on hard indicators such as the public
service televisions’ market share, their overall financial situation, and softer ones
such as program quality. Audience market share is the best indicator of perfor-
mance, since the financial situation is subject to various intervening factors, such
as the size of the country or state subsidies. The model established by the BBC
to reform and improve costs and benefits, known as the ‘producer’s choice’, was
promoted by the European Broadcasting Union in 1991.  The model grants
managerial freedom to the producer and encourages competition between exter-
nal and internal production and personnel within the framework of a continuous
cost-benefit analysis. Producer’s choice has been applied in varying degrees
throughout Western European public service broadcasters.
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4. The concept comes from Italy, as does lotizzazione. Pasquarelli, general director of RAI was the
first to state publicly that the most important decisions are not even taken by the management of
RAI. Management choices are drastically limited by Parliament committees, government and unions’
decisions, thus leaving a very limited space for maneuver.
5. Cf. Coopers & Lybrand Audit Report of TVR, March 1997.
The performance of public service television in ECE is furthermore affected
by specific factors that can be described as ‘transition effects’ and ‘development
effects’. 
5.1. Transition effects
Public service television, as other state enterprises in ECE, was badly affect-
ed by market reforms. Inflation diminished the license’s value, and governments
proved unable to take timely and adequate measures to counteract this develop-
ment. Transmission costs, typically still in the hands of another autonomous
state company with a monopoly in the sector, increased dramatically due to lib-
eralized prices in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. 
5.2. Development effects
Despite reforms, it took years for the market economy to become ‘function-
ing’, as put by the European Commission. Two factors unrelated to television
must be considered when analyzing public service television under-performance
in ECE countries. 
The first factor is the relatively heavy dependence of the advertising market
on overall economic performance, which was good in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, but poor in Romania and Bulgaria. A second factor to
consider when comparing countries is population differences – a country as large
as Poland with over 40 million inhabitants provides the largest market in the
region and therefore the largest license fee revenues. Romania is a medium-sized
country (22 million inhabitants), while Hungary and the Czech Republic are rel-
atively small (with about 10 million inhabitants each).
Table 5. Context indicators of the audio-visual environment
Context indicators Poland Hungary Czech Romania Bulgaria
Republic
Advertising expenditure 580 190 140 93 17
(million USD/1997)
Number of households 12,505 3,869 4,185 7,782 2,264
(millions)
Color television sets (%) 92 85 92 67 81
Cable subscribers (%) 31 41 17 44 28
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Television is an entertainment and news medium for all. Poor households
will cut other expenses to purchase a color television. Cable is widely used in
ECE, even in comparison to some Western European countries and the United
States. In a survey of the urban unemployed population in Romania in October
1999, 62 percent of residents were found to own color television sets, mostly
acquired after 1989, and over 40 percent were paying for cable access.
Table 6. Performance and independence indicators reunited
Indicators Freedom of Freedom of TVP 
broadcasting (FH) the press (FH) marketshare  (%)
Hungary 13 28 15 (1999)
Romania 21 43 20 (2000)
Czech Republic 12 24 34 (1999)
Bulgaria 14 26 35 (2001)
Poland 19 19 47 (2000)
Legend: Freedom House (FH) scores from 0 maximum freedom to 45 minimum. Managerial
freedom szores from * maximum freedom to **** severcly restricted freedom, ratings by yhe author.
The market share indicators in Table 6 clearly show that public service tele-
vision in ECE is in serious trouble. The public service lost its audience market
share in only a few years, in direct relation with the rise of commercial television.
Advertising revenues have shrunk accordingly, leaving public service broadcast-
ers at the mercy of license fees and therefore, once again, at the mercy of gov-
ernments.
Answers vary as to whether the situation as it is now is sustainable. Politicians
are obviously content with the status quo and appoint their cronies or “yes-men”
to various supervising boards. One broadcasting board member interviewed
explained the need for commercial television as well as public service television
to provide ‘high culture’. What was his previous position and what did he mean
by ‘high culture’? He had been the president’s chief-of-staff and by ‘high culture’
he meant opera. When asked to indicate a favorite opera composer the board
member quoted Beethoven. 
In general, public service television channels in ECE are highly unstable.
Managers cannot cope with the tremendous challenges they face, and risk hav-
ing their position on the line when they run counter to political interests. Even
relatively successful moderate reformers face chronic threats from parliaments.
Private stations’ lobbies, which have become more and more involved in elec-
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toral campaign funding, are a major contributor to this threat. Public service
broadcasters need and want a change in legislation to exit this vicious circle. But
the unanimous opinion, from the almost bankrupt MTV to the relatively well-
off PTV, is that politicians are not going to revise media laws to prevent the
political subordination of public service broadcasters any time soon.
6. What is to be done
As its market share decreases, politicians may lose interest in public television,
and have to increasingly turn their attention towards private media. This may be
good news: the less politicians are interested in public broadcasting, the more pub-
lic television will have a chance to reform itself and survive. When the audience
returns back to public broadcasting, however, political infighting will resume. Such
periods do not last for long. Reformers need worked out policies to act upon fast
when windows of opportunity present themselves, such as in the Czech television
in 2000-2001 when the public backed reform. I suggest a ‘salvage package’ result-
ing from the lessons learned in the last decade which would include three major
points.
6.1. Revising the legislation
A better alternative to the present formula would be to give up television
boards as they are today in favour of broadcasting boards regulating all the actors
in the field, not just the public media. Those broadcasting boards would appoint
the general managers of the public service broadcaster (on the German model),
grant frequencies, enforce rules and mediate conflicts. As the parliament would
appoint most broadcasting board members (civil society, represented by profes-
sional associations and media watchdog NGOs would appoint the rest), the sec-
ond accountability mechanism, making parliamentary committees supervisory
bodies, should also be abandoned. The broadcasting board would allow both pub-
lic service television and radio to be run by the general managers with the help of
a management team which they would select (see Figure 1). This is roughly the
way the BBC works. The management team should be restricted to the financial
director, the programs director, the marketing director and the news director.
Political appointments and the participation of channel employers or trade
union leaders in the broadcasting board should be forbidden. Board members
appointed by parties should not be party members, although they may legiti-
mately hold political sympathies. Legal revisions promoting professional man-
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agement are certain to come, as three countries surveyed (Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Poland) have been invited to join the European Union in 2004,
with Romania and Bulgaria set to join in 2007. This means tighter deficit bud-
gets and less freedom for governments to cover losses in the state sector.
Eventually, managers will have to be empowered.
6.2. Reinventing management
Revising legislation takes time and is not sufficient to ensure positive change.
In many cases, managers seeking change will need to begin radical reforms before
legal revisions are on the agenda. Management reforms should aim to create insti-
tutions that operate on a cost effective basis, much like modern corporations. This
implies an awareness of actual costs – an assessment that can be difficult for enter-
prises that are accustomed to in-house production, and where the widespread
assumption is that everything that is not ordered from outside the institution is
free. An effective tool to decide how to revise the programming schedule is to
divide a program’s cost by its audience share. Expensive shows with no audience
should be cut regardless of the producer. Scheduling should be based on audience
research. The public is the ‘number one client’, and what the public wants is
important on all accounts. This does not mean giving up specialized shows, where
audience research methods other than surveys can be used (such as focus groups).
The targeted group must however be constantly surveyed for feedback. Shows are
there for the public to enjoy, and not as a means for the producers to get paid and
support their network of clients invited regardless of viewers’ opinions of them.
The channel’s size must be adjusted to match market needs. Public stations
cannot continue to produce everything in-house. This practice forces channels
to pay continuously for low-quality services used only occasionally. Advertising
sales departments are a typical and important example here. All countries sur-
veyed have an advertising market share that is inferior to the audience market
share. One reason is that the typical audience of non-commercial channels mat-
ters less to advertisers, as they tend to be less well off and to reside in rural areas.
A second, more important reason for inadequate advertising on public television
is that state-owned advertising departments are simply not efficient. They can-
not pay sales commissions nor can they offer decent salaries that would help pre-
vent their salespeople from falling prey to corruption. The only solution is to
contract advertising sales outside the enterprise just like other services that can
be delivered better and cheaper by the competitive market. This, however,
means layoffs and severance packages. Nevertheless, severance on the basis of
managerial logic works and is far preferable to indiscriminate severance packages.
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Indiscriminate severance packages preserve managerial problems and do not save
money in the long run, since wages only represent a small part of the public tele-
vision budget in these countries compared to Western countries. (This is so
despite the fact that public television wages in ECE tend to be at least double the
average wage and more than double the to wages in the public sector.) 
Unfortunately, successful reforms cannot be achieved without some support
from trade unions that fear restructuring and the imposition of managerial logic
even more than they do giving up jobs. Promoting competence and discouraging
micromanagement can also prevent the creation of new jobs. The Romanian TVR
retained more than one hundred drivers in 1998 and the trade unions banned any-
one else from driving in order to ensure that those drivers would keep their jobs.
In-house foreign affairs departments are the most striking communist-era
feature of some public television channels in the region. (These departments
once enjoyed the monopoly of contacts with the West both as a protocol and a
surveillance function.) Public service television in ECE still has to fight its com-
munist inheritance. Television is about teamwork, while communist ideology
separated people in categories, not teams. The result is that technical assistants,
cameramen, journalists and editors often belong to different departments and to
trade unions that are unable to communicate, not to mention properly coordi-
nate. This has also led to an organizational structure based around working in
shifts – the Romanian TVR had to negotiate with the trade unions to allow cam-
eramen to stay extra hours to ensure their presence when their piece was ready
for editing. Team spirit must be introduced in order to improve performance. 
6.3. Forging new identities
The recommendations mentioned thus far are simple prescriptions of the
type usually given by management consultants. The task of forging new identi-
ties for public service television is more challenging. Massive audience loss  and
the effort to catch up has left public service television with a weak public image.
When asked to answer questions about the future, focus groups in Bucharest
in the fall of 1999 compared public service television to an ageing lady using too
much make-up in the effort to attract rich, young bachelors. When using car
metaphors, public service television was compared to a Renault 4 car series from
the 1960s, while its main private competitor was compared to the latest models
of the luxury Mercedes automobiles. When public service television was alone
in the market, identity was not perceived to be a problem. In the current mar-
ket, however, identity has become an obvious problem. The solution lies in
shifting the focus from a comparison between commercial and public service
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television to an effort to shape public service channel identity via special logos,
sets, costumes and profiles of the daily and weekly programs (just as commercial
channels have distinct identities). 
Western public service television has succeeded in this regard, as it is easy to
recognize the distinct character of the BBC, Euronews, RAI or ARD. Public ser-
vice television in ECE continues to lack such style due to the inadequacy of its
supporting structures. Creative departments continue to work with tenured
designers hired in the 1970s and real research departments still do not exist. 
7. Closing remarks
Can public service television in ECE survive the post-communist transition
period? The answer depends on its ability to compete in the new media market.
I believe public service television can effectively compete in the market while
retaining a specific role and identity, distinct from its private competitors. In
today’s market, it is impossible to disregard competition and provide good tele-
vision. As a public service channel, despite its vast resources the European all-
news channel Euronews had poor news programs. Its only shareholders,
European member states, heavily protected the channel. As soon as ITN took up
its management and 49 percent of its shares, competition with CNN became a
target, and Euronews began providing live coverage and improving its programs.
Good television is competitive television, and European partner states entrust-
ing the management of Euronews to ITN implicitly admitted that today’s pub-
lic service companies must be run along the same lines as private companies are.
One could argue that such a model is not possible, pointing to the fact that
the leading public service television, the BBC, carries no advertising and has
therefore no connection to the market. This is simply wrong. The BBC has
experience dealing with a competitive market since the 1950s, due to the early
existence of private television in Britain (since 1955). In fact, the BBC was the
first public service television to discover that ratings are important not in terms
of advertising revenues, but in terms of influence, legitimacy and finally as the
primary source of consumer feedback. Critiques of the audience ratings system
as undermining democracy are misplaced. Ratings and polls coincide with
Churchill’s definition of democracy – they are the ‘least bad’ indicators possible.
After so much proof of self-interested leadership, if the public cannot choose,
then who should? The government? The elites? The journalists? 
Because accountability mechanisms are generally difficult to design, audience
ratings, polls, and qualitative research remain essential. The main intellectual
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delusion with television is the assumption that it is so powerful a communication
medium that it must use this power to be anything but television, i.e. a medium
for popular culture, a school, university, library, church etc. We should allow
schools, universities, churches, etc. to pursue their roles without competition
from television. Television that attempts to compete with them in this day and
age will cease to be television and lose market share to other channels without
ever being able to match the depth of these social institutions or succeed in con-
veying their public message. Videotapes, CD-ROMs and the Internet are acces-
sible to schools and universities that can utilize multiple media to reach pupils
and students according to their interests and talents. Terrestrial television, by
definition, must target the largest population possible. 
Under such circumstances one may question whether public service television
is worth preserving as an institution. Looking at ECE realities rather than Western
models, public service television still appears necessary. Democratization of the
press does not always mean that the press will promote democracy in countries that
are not yet democratic. Instead it often allows free hate speech and vested interests
to distort the public debate. It is important to identify the new owners of private
television and their interests before relying on them as the only trustees of the
broadcast message. Local political culture often means that journalists working in
the private sector are unprotected from the political interests of their publishers.
There is no consensus among publishers that independent journalism is an indis-
pensable norm of quality for their products. Instead, the general understanding is
that the private media should be biased in favor of its sponsors, political parties or
interest groups, just as the public service media has a pro-government bias. 
If politicians and inefficient management destroy ECE public service televi-
sion entirely, or reduce it to the state of a chronically weak actor of little influ-
ence, the public will be the loser. The emerging winners will be the handful of
businessmen who own commercial television channels and nourish important
political ambitions (such as managers of private channels in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Romania). Whether such negative developments can be avoided
depends on civil society in each ECE country. Czech intellectuals showed their
discontent with NOVA Television and political interventionism in Czech TV.
Civil society groups in other countries have lacked a coherent position toward
the public service media, often simply accusing them of siding with governments
without discussing and proposing new institutional mechanisms or campaigning
to prevent the control of public media by political parties. If interested civil soci-
ety actors do not join forces to establish or recover the missing link between the
public service media and the public, no one else will.
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